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consumer lying between the two …rms. As is well known, the price-location
problem is a two-stage game in which at the …rst stage the …rms choose their
location and at the second stage choose their prices. The game is simultaneous.
The optimal …rms’ behaviour obviously di¤ers according to the value of w:
The results in terms of optimal locations are well known in the literature when
w = 1 and when w = 0: in the unconstrained Hotelling game with a uniform
distribution of consumers the …rms maximize pro…ts by locating at ¡1=4 e 5=4
(Lambertini, 1994); moreover, Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) demonstrate that with
a triangular distribution two asymmetric equilibria arise,
¡¡p6=9; 5p6=18¢ and¡
1¡ 5p6=18; 1 +p6=9¢. The following analysis will focus on the price-location
equilibria for intermediate values of the parameter w, i.e. when the density
becomes trapezoidal.
3 Consumer concentration and equilibrium prices
and locations
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium through backward induction, solving
…rst for the prices and then for the locations as a function of the exogenous
parameter w and the optimal prices determined in the …rst stage. Notice that if
…rm 1 and 2 set a price respectively equal to p1 and p2 being located respectively
in a and b, the above hypotheses on transportation costs, unit demand and full
market coverage imply that the marginal consumer’s location is
z =
µ
1
2
·
p2 ¡ p1
b¡ a + b¡ a
¸
+ a
¶
(1)
Clearly, given the shape of our density, the …rms’ reaction functions in both
stages of the game will be di¤erent according to the fact that the …rms know that
their behaviour implies that the marginal consumer lies in the ’central interval’
or in the two external intervals, i.e. z 2
·
1¡w
2
;
1 +w
2
¸
- central interval -
or z 2
·
0;
1¡w
2
¶
and z 2.
µ
1 +w
2
; 1
¸
- external interval. We solve the model
under both conjectures and verify under which conditions one or more equilibria
exist in which conjectures are ful…lled. Notice that, given the simmetry of the
density, the possible existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium such that z 2·
0;
1¡w
2
¶
implies the existence of a specular equilibrium, with the marginal
consumer lying in a specular position within the interval
µ
1 +w
2
; 1
¸
. This
allows to restrict the analysis to one external area only.
3.1 The marginal consumer lies in the central interval
Given the hypothesis of unit consumers’ demand and given our normalization,
the market demand for each good corresponds to its market share. Therefore,
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the demand for the two …rms are respectively:
q1 = F (z;w)
q2 = 1¡ F (z;w)
where F is the cumulative function of f . As long as z 2
·
1¡w
2
;
1 +w
2
¸
,
q1 (z;w) =
2z ¡ 12 (1 +w)
1 +w
so that, by substituting (1), we get:
q1 =
Ã
p2¡p1
b¡a + b+ a+
1
2 (w ¡ 1)
1 +w
!
(2)
The demand accruing to the …rm 2 will be:
q2 =
"
1¡
Ã
p2¡p1
b¡a + b+ a+
1
2 (w ¡ 1)
1 +w
!#
(3)
Since there are no production costs, the pro…t functions of the two …rms are:
¼1 =
"
p1
Ã
p2¡p1
b¡a + b+ a+
1
2 (w ¡ 1)
1 +w
!#
(4)
¼2 =
"
p2
Ã
1¡
p2¡p1
b¡a + b+ a+
1
2 (w ¡ 1)
1 + w
!#
(5)
3.1.1 The price stage
By di¤erentiating the …rms’ pro…t functions and solving the …rst order condition
with respect to prices, we …nd the following reaction functions:
p1 =
1
2
·
p2 + b
2 ¡ a2 ¡ 1
2
(a+ b+w (b¡ a))
¸
p2 =
1
2
·
p1 ¡ b2 + a2 ¡ 1
2
(3 (a+ b) +w (b¡ a))
¸
The Nash equilibrium in prices is therefore:
p1 =
1
3
¡
b2 ¡ a2¢+ 1
6
(b¡ a) + 1
2
w (b¡ a) (6)
p2 =
1
3
¡
a2 ¡ b2¢+ 5
6
(b¡ a) + 1
2
w (b¡ a) (7)
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3.1.2 The location stage
Substituting the optimal prices in (4) and (5) , pro…ts are expressed as a function
of locations and w:
¼¤1 =
1
6
·
1
3
¡
b2 ¡ a2¢+ 1
6
(b¡ a) + 1
2
w (b¡ a)
¸
2 (b+ a) + 1 + 3w
1 +w
¼¤2 =
1
6
·
5
6
(b¡ a) + 1
2
w (b¡ a)¡ 1
3
¡
b2 ¡ a2¢¸ 5 + 3w ¡ 2 (a+ b)
1 +w
The …rst and second order condition for pro…t maximization are satis…ed for
a = ¡1
6
¡ 1
2
w +
1
3
b (8)
b =
1
3
a+
5
6
+
1
2
w (9)
The solution of the system (8) and (9) gives the optimal symmetric locations
a¤ = 18 ¡ 38w e b¤ = 78 + 38w. If …rms locate in a¤ and b¤, their optimal prices
are p¤1 = p¤2 =
3
8 +
3
4w +
3
8w
2 and the indi¤erent consumer is located in 12 : the
conjecture that the indi¤erent consumer lies in the central area is ful…lled. We
can therefore establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For all values of w 2 (0; 1] there exist a subgame perfect sym-
metric Nash equilibrium in prices and locations.
Notice that the optimal locations coincide with those identi…ed in Lamber-
tini (1994), a = ¡14 e b = 54 ; when w = 1. The optimal prices are increasing in
w: a higher degree of concentration around the midlle (lower w) induces …rms to
move inwards in order to match the tastes of a growing share of consumers: the
more concentrated is the consumer distribution, the less the …rms di¤erentiate
their products.. This reduced di¤erentiation strenghten price competition. The
overall equilibrium shows clearly a dominance of the demand e¤ect: the advan-
tage of acquiring the consumers in the central area dominates the advantage of
softening competition through a large product di¤erentiation.
3.2 The marginal consumer lies in one of the external in-
tervals
Now we want to verify whether there exist subgame perfect equilibria, such that
the marginal consumer falls in the left external interval
£
0; 1¡w2
¤
. In this interval
the density function’s slope is 41¡w2 . Hence, as z 2
£
0; 1¡w2
¤
, the demand for
…rm 1 is:
q1 (z;w) =
z2
1
2 (1 +w) (1¡w)
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Substituting (1) in the above expression we obtain the following demand func-
tions in terms of the locations and prices:
q1 =
0BBB@
µ
1
2
·
p2 ¡ p1
b¡ a + b¡ a
¸
+ a
¶2
1
2 (1 +w) (1¡w)
1CCCA
q2 =
266641¡
µ
1
2
·
p2 ¡ p1
b¡ a + b¡ a
¸
+ a
¶2
1
2 (1 +w) (1¡w)
37775
The pro…t functions are:
¼1 = p1
0BBB@
µ
1
2
·
p2 ¡ p1
b¡ a + b¡ a
¸
+ a
¶2
(1 +w)
¡
1
2 ¡ 12w
¢
1CCCA
¼2 = p2
266641¡
µ
1
2
·
p2 ¡ p1
b¡ a + b¡ a
¸
+ a
¶2
(1 +w)
¡
1
2 ¡ 12w
¢
37775
3.2.1 The price stage
The …rst and second order conditions for pro…t maximization with respect to
…rm 1’s price are satis…ed by the following reaction function:1
p1 =
1
3
¡
p2 + b
2 ¡ a2¢ (10)
As far as …rm 2 is concerned, the …rst and second order conditions are satis…ed
by the reaction function:2
p2 = ¡2
3
b2 +
2
3
a2 +
2
3
p1 +
1
3
q
[p1 + (a2 ¡ b2)]2 + [6 (b2 + a2)¡ 12ba] (1¡ w2)
(11)
1The …rst order condition is satis…ed also by p1 =
¡
p2 + b2 ¡ a2
¢
. However, at this solution
the second order condition for a maximum is not satis…ed for w < 1.
2Again, we have two solutions satisfying the FOC. The other solution
p22 = ¡
2
3
b2 +
2
3
a2 +
2
3
p1 ¡ 1
3
q
[p1 + (a2 ¡ b2)]2 + [6 (b2 + a2)¡ 12ba] (1¡ w2)
does not satis…es the second order condition.
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The solution of the system (10) and (11) gives the following Nash equilibrium
in prices:
p1 = ½ (b¡ a)
p2 = 3½b¡ 3½a¡ b2 + a2
where ½ is a root of the polynomial 8x2 ¡ 2 (b+ a)x+ ¡w2 ¡ 1¢.
The existence of two solutions demonstrates that the reaction functions in-
tersect twice. Since the two roots of the polynomial are
x1 = ¡1
8
(a+ b) +
1
8
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
x2 = ¡1
8
(a+ b)¡ 1
8
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
we may establish that these intersections occur at the following two price cou-
ples:
p1 = ¡1
8
(a¡ b)
µ
a+ b¡
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶
(12)
p2 = ¡3
8
µ
a+ b¡
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶
(a¡ b) + a2 ¡ b2 (13)
using solution x1, or
p1 = ¡1
8
(a¡ b)
µ
a+ b+
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶
(14)
p2 = ¡3
8
(a¡ b)
µ
a+ b+
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶
+ a2 ¡ b2 (15)
using solution x2. It must be noticed, however, that only (14) and (15) en-
tail positive prices at equilibrium for both …rms. Therefore this is the only
economically meaningful economic solution to the price game.
3.2.2 The location stage
The pro…t functions calculated at the optimal prices are:
¼1 =
1
32
(a¡ b)
µ
a+ b+
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶3
(1 +w) (¡1 +w)
¼2 =
·
¡38
µ
a+ b+
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶
(a¡ b) + a2 ¡ b2
¸
266641¡
0@ 1
2
24
h
¡ 38
³
a+b+
p
(a+b)2+8(1¡w2)
´
(a¡b)+a2¡b2
i
+
h
1
8 (a¡b)
³
a+b+
p
(a+b)2+8(1¡w2)
´i
b¡a +b¡a
35+a
1A2
1
2 (1¡w2)
37775
9
By di¤erentiating …rm 1’s pro…ts with respect to its location, we get the
following …rst order condition:
1
32
µ
a+ b+
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
¶3 q(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2) + 3 (a¡ b)
(w2 ¡ 1)
q
(a+ b)2 + 8 (1¡w2)
= 0
which gives the optimal location:3
a =
5
4
b¡ 1
4
p
9b2 + 16 (1¡w2) (16)
If we now di¤erentiate …rm 2’s pro…ts with respect to its location, and
substitute the reaction function (16), tedious calculations (see the Appendix)
show that we can identify the following acceptable solution:
b =
5
18
p
6 (1¡w2) (17)
Using (17) into (16) we have
a = ¡1
9
p
6 (1¡w2) (18)
Therefore, equations (17) and (18) give the optimal locations as a function of w,
under the conjecture that the marginal consumer lies in the interval
·
0;
1¡w
2
¶
.
We now have to verify whether there is a range of w such that this conjecture
is actually ful…lled. We …rst notice that when w = 0 - i.e. when the density
describing the consumers’ preferences is a symmetric triangle - the equations
(17) and (18) collapse to a = ¡19
p
6 and b = 518
p
6, that correspond exactly
to Tabuchi and Thisse’s solutions. In general, when evaluated at the optimal
locations (17) and (18), the price equations (14) and (15) become respectively:
p1 =
7
18
¡
1¡w2¢ (19)
p2 =
7
9
¡
1¡w2¢ (20)
By substituting in (17)-(20) into (1), we …nd the marginal consumer’s location
as a function of w:
z =
1
2
¡
1¡w2¢p
6 (1¡w2) +
1
12
p
6 (1¡w2)
3The above FOC has two solutions. The other is a = 5
4
b + 1
4
p
9b2 + 16 (1¡w2), which
does not satisfy the condition a < b.
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This allows us to establish that the …rms’ conjectures generating the asymmetric
equilibrium (17)-(20) are ful…lled if
1
2
¡
1¡w2¢p
6 (1¡w2) +
1
12
p
6 (1¡w2) < 1¡w
2
i.e., if w < 15 . By a similar reasoning, it can be proved that, under the same
condition on w, a specular asymmetric equilibrium exists, with the marginal
consumer lying in the right external interval, with …rms located respectively at
a = 1 ¡ 5p6 (1¡w2)=18 and b = p6 (1¡w2)=9. We can therefore establish
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For 0 < w < 15 there exist three subgame perfect Nash equilibria
in prices and locations, a symmetric equilibrium and two asymmetric ones.
Notice that in the asymmetric equilibria one …rm locates outside the market
area, while the other locates in the external interval opposite to that in which
lies the marginal consumer. As w increases in the admissible range
£
0; 15
¢
, both
…rms move inwards. Given w, the …rm locating within the market area may
charge higher prices and enjoy higher pro…ts.
It may be interesting to ask what happens when w = 15 . In this case, the
asymmetric equilibria de…ned above make the marginal consumer fall in 25 , or
specularly in 35 , i.e. in correspondence of the hedges of the density function.
This is a situation similar to that Tabuchi and Thisse describe with respect to
a possible symmetric equilibrium: since the density is not di¤erentiable, the
reaction functions are indeed discontinuous.
Let us assume that the solution (17)-(20) holds forw = 15 . Then the following
results would apply:
a = ¡ 4
15
, b =
2
3
p1 =
28
75
, p2 =
56
75
, z =
2
5
¼1 =
28
225
, ¼2 =
112
225
In order to ensure that it is indeed an equilibrium, we must exclude the prof-
itability of unilateral deviations from the candidate equilibrium location, in
correspondence of the admissible prices for such a location. Let us de…ne the
alternative location for …rm 1:
a0 = ¡ 4
15
+ ²
If …rm 1 locates in a0, while …rm 2 locates in 23 , the marginal consumer lies in
the central interval, and the price rules (6)-(7) apply, so that
p1 =
268
675
¡ 4
15
²¡ 1
3
µ
¡ 4
15
+ ²
¶2
p2 =
488
675
¡ 14
15
²+
1
3
µ
¡ 4
15
+ ²
¶2
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When evaluated at these prices, and at a0 = ¡ 415 + ², and b = 23 , the pro…ts of
…rm 1 turn out to be
5
6
Ã
268
675
¡ 4
15
²¡ 1
3
µ
¡ 4
15
+ ²
¶2!Ã 44
135 ¡ 23²+ 23
¡¡ 415 + ²¢2
14
15 ¡ ²
+ ²
!
>
28
225
for arbitrarily small positive values of ². This is enough to prove that, for
w = 15 , the solutions (17)-(20) are not subgame perfect equilibria and allows
us to establish that for w = 1=5 there exists only a subgame perfect symmetric
Nash equilibrium in prices and locations, de…ned by equations (6)-(9).
4 Remarks and conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the e¤ects of the consumers’ concentration to-
wards the middle of the space of product characteristics, in a a model of horizon-
tal di¤erentiation with quadratic transportation costs. The consumers’ density
is assumed to be symmetric and trapezoidal; if the size of the market is nor-
malized to 1, this allows to consider the lenght of the shortest base as a mean
preserving spread of consumers’ preferences. Clearly, the traditional uniform
distribution and a symmetric triangular distribution can be nested into this
setup as limit cases.
We have proved that as far as the shortest base is positive - i.e. the distri-
bution is di¤erentiable at 1=2 - a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
exists in the two stage price-location game. The result we achieve is rather
intuitive: starting from the optimal solution obtained under the standard uni-
form distribution, as preferences become more concentrated around the middle,
both …rms move inwards and reduce the degree of product di¤erentiation. This
clearly reinforces price competition and results in lower equilibrium prices. This
result is consistent with a more general intuition that homogeneity of consumers
might have important implications in terms of reducing the …rms’market power
(Benassi, Chirco, and Scrimitore, 2002).
Moreover, our discussion shows that the asymmetric equilibria identi…ed by
Tabuchi and Thisse may coexist with the above symmetric equilibrium. For
a relevant range of values of our mean preserving spread parameter - when
preferences become su¢ciently concentrated - two asymmetric subgame perfect
equilibria appear, with one …rm producing a relatively ’average’ product, and
the other …rm choosing to locate outside the characteristics space. Once one
…rm decides to produce a product which meets the taste of the large share of
consumers located around the middle, the other …rm …nds it optimal to avoid
a destructive price competition by choosing a product with ’extreme’ and ’out
of market’ characteristics. However, this peculiar location choice requires that
a low price is charged, in order to capture at least the consumers located at
the nearest tail of the distribution. This solution is such that as w increases
within its admissible range - the distribution becomes more dispersed - both
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